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Kant and the general freedom of action
Kant e a liberdade geral de ação
Fiete Kalscheuer1
Abstract: The legal philosophy of Immanuel Kant is 
complex and often confusing. Nevertheless Kant deve-
loped one of the most important liberal theories in the 
history of legal philosophy. The basic idea is simple: 
The necessity to protect the general freedom of action 
is the starting point of his Doctrine of Law. The only 
condition for this protection is that this freedom has 
to be compatible with the freedom of everybody else. 
Accordingly, for Kant even allegedly trivial actions 
belong to the realm of the judicial protection of the 
universal law of right. The question, which is to be 
answered in this essay, is: Why? - For what reason, 
Kant thinks, that there is the necessity to protect the 
general freedom of action.
Keywords: Immanuel Kant, general freedom of action, 
categorical imperative.
1 Cursou Direito em Greifswald, St. Petersburg e Kiel. Doutorou-se em Direito 
na Universidade de Kiel, junto à Cátedra de Direito Público e Filosofia do 
Direito, sob a supervisão de Robert Alexy. É advogado e leciona nos Cursos 
Preparatórios Alpmann-Schmidt, em Kiel. 
Kant and the general freedom of action
revista Brasileira de estudos Políticos | Belo horizonte | n. 118 | pp. 191-205 | jan./jun. 2019
192
Resumo: A filosofia do direito de Immanuel Kant é 
complexa e muitas vezes confusa. Contudo, Kant de-
senvolveu uma das mais importantes teorias liberais 
na história da filosofia do direito. A ideia básica é 
simples: a necessidade de proteger a liberdade geral 
de ação é o ponto de partida da Doutrina do Direito. A 
única condição para essa proteção é que essa liberdade 
seja compatível com a liberdade de todos. Assim, para 
Kant, até mesmo ações triviais pertencem ao âmbito 
da proteção jurídica da lei universal do direito. A 
questão que pretende se responder neste ensaio é: Por 
que? – Por qual razão Kant acredita que a liberdade 
geral de ação deve ser protegida?
Palavras-chave: Immanuel Kant, liberdade geral de 
ação, imperativo categórico.
I. Introduction
It is common knowledge that Kant`s ideas have had 
a major influence on the decisions of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court of Germany concerning Art. 1 I of the German 
Basic Law, the dignity of man. The Federal Constitutional 
Court, relying on Kant`s second formula of the categorical 
imperative, the end-in-itself-formula2, describes the rights 
and duties that follow from Art. 1 I of German Basic Law 
as follows:
2 The end-in-itself-formula says: “So act that you use humanity, whether in 
your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as 
an end, never merely as a means.” (I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals, in The Cambridge Edition Of The Works Of Immanuel Kant – 
Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. M.J. Gregor [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996], 37 – 108 at AA 429).
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“Human dignity as such is affected when a concrete human 
being is reduced to an object, to a mere means, to a dispensable 
quantity.”3
A lesser-known fact is that the Federal Constitutional 
Court also interprets Art 2 I of the German Basic Law – the 
general right of freedom of action – in line with Kant`s ideas. 
The Federal Constitutional Court for Germany understands 
regular legal practice as outlined in Art. 2 I of the German 
Basic Law as a basic right to universal freedom of action in 
a broad sense: Art. 2 I of the German Basic Law protects all 
human actions.4 This broad interpretation of Art 2 I of the 
German Basic Law is not without its critics.. In a famous 
dissenting opinion, Federal Constitutional Court Judge D. 
Grimm expressed the opinion that this broad interpretation 
of the extent of protection of Art 2 I of the German Basic Law 
would lead to a “banalization of basic rights” not intended 
by the Basic Law.5 
The broad interpretation of the majority opinion of the 
Federal Constitutional Court, Art 2I of the German Basic Law 
corresponds to Kant`s universal law of right6, the centerpiece 
of his legal Doctrine of Law. Through its application one can 
determine whether an action is legal or illegal. According 
to the universal law of right, an action is legal if the doer 
3 BVerfGE 9, 89 (95); 27, 1 (6); 28, 386 (391); 50, 125 (133); 72, 105 (116); 87, 209 
(228); 109, 279 (312). Regarding the question whether the recourse to Kant 
really is consistent with his ideas about human dignity, see F. Kalscheuer, 
Menschenwürde als Recht im Unrecht. Zur Ergänzungsfunktion der 
Menschenwürde im Recht bei Kant, in: Der Staat 2013 Bd. 52, Page 401 ff.
4 BVerfGE, Bd. 80, 137 (151 f.).
5 Sondervotum D. Grimm, BVerfGE, Bd. 80, 137 (165 ff.).
6 Kant`s universal law of right says: “[S]o act externally that the free use of your 
choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal 
law.” (I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in The Cambridge 
Edition Of The Works Of Immanuel Kant – Practical Philosophy, trans. and 
ed. M.J. Gregor [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996] at 388).
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respects to the highest degree the freedom of others, to do or 
not to do, what he or she wants. Hence, the focus of the uni-
versal law of right is the protection of the external freedom 
of the individual. According to Kant, the only condition for 
this protection is that this freedom has to be compatible with 
the freedom of everybody else. Accordingly, for Kant even 
allegedly trivial actions belong to the realm of the judicial 
protection of the universal law of right. 
Kant calls the right to generally do or not to do, what 
one wants, the only natural human right. With regard to this 
“restriction of the area of the natural human right to legally 
defined external freedom, Kant arguably stands alone in the 
history of ideas on human rights.”7 
The obvious question is: what reason can be named 
to justify giving the universal freedom of action such huge 
significance that – at least prima facie – every action is con-
sidered worthy of legal protection? The prevailing juridical 
opinion on Art 2 I of the German Basic Law mainly answers 
this question by referring to the historical will of the parlia-
mentary council, that demonstrably acted on the assumption 
of a broad understanding of the universal freedom of action.8 
Kant, however, gives a philosophically grounded answer to 
the question of why universal freedom of action in general 
enjoys legal protection. What exactly Kant`s answer is, is 
disputed and is the subject of this essay. 
The question, why even allegedly trivial actions 
(should) benefit from legal protection, as long as they do not 
violate the rights of others, is therefore not (only) an academic 
intellectual game.9 J. Ipsen justifiably called the dispute about 
7  W. Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit. Immanuel Kants Rechts- und 
Staatsphilosophie, 1984, at 209.
8 V. Epping, S. Lenz, Grundrechte, 2014 Rn. 563 m. w. N.
9 It seems important to point this out explicitly. G. Geismann writes in his 
review of the dissertation “Autonomie als Grund und Grenze des Rechts” 
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the extent of protection of the universal freedom of action 
“a first-rate problem of the dogma of basic rights as well as 
the theory of basic law.”10 Further, his question is not only a 
matter of the aforementioned problems. Rather the decisions 
of the Federal Constitutional Court on Art. 2 I of the German 
Basic Law have direct effects, for example, on administrative 
law. Without the adjudication of the Federal Constitutional 
Court on Art. 2 I of the German Basic Law there could be 
no so-called “theory of addressee”11, which states that every 
incriminating administrative act entails the possibility of an 
infringement and therefore affirms a right of action according 
to § 42 II of the German administrative code of procedure. 
It is only the general protection of the universal freedom of 
action that leads to the fact that every action by the state that 
burdens a citizen requires a justification and is subject to an 
examination by an independent court. 
II. On the value of the general freedom of action 
according to Kant
According to the view presented in this essay, Kant`s 
universal freedom of action is grounded in the idea, that 
every human being should be given a legally recognized 
area of protection that offers him or her the opportunity to 
(F. Kalscheuer) im Philosophischen Literaturanzeiger 67/4/2014, p. 311 (319 
that he has “strong” memories of “Kleists townjudge Adam”, when reading 
the discussion about the question why, according to Kant, also supposed 
trivial actions benefit from legal protection.  The statement by Geismann 
shows how important it is that the philosophy of law should not be left to 
pure philosophers alone, but to have legally skilled people dealing with it 
as well.  
10  J. Ipsen, Staatsrecht II, Grundrechte, 2015, Rn. 771. § 42 Rn. 69 m. w. N.
11 Regarding the theory of addressee see exemplary Kopp/Schenke, VwGO 
Kommentar, 2015, § 42 Rn. 69 m.w.N.
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fulfill the moral responsibilities of the categorical imperative 
in the empirical-social world, i.e. in “real life.”12 One may 
call this the “thesis of realization,”13 or perhaps more accura-
tely, the “thesis of protection.”14 The thesis seem intuitively 
plausible: Autonomy, i.e. acting according to the categorical 
imperative, cannot be experienced on a sensual level, but 
it can at least become a reality in the empirical world as a 
“sensual sign.”15 It stands to reason that this sensual sign 
is worth protecting. If there is a moral duty to perform a 
certain action, then a human being is commanded to fulfill 
that moral responsibility in the empirical–social world. Even 
though the thesis is immediately understandable, it has been 
subject to criticism.16 
12 See F. Kalscheuer, Autonomie als Grund und Grenze des Rechts. Zum 
Verhältnis zwischen dem kategorischen Imperativ und dem allgemeinen 
Rechtsgesetz Kants, 2014, p. 206 ff.; a former author who defended this thesis 
is, among others, B. Bauch, Grundzüge der Ethik, 1968, p. 218; G. Dulckeit, 
Naturrecht und positives Recht bei Kant, 1932, p. 5; K.Larenz, Sittlichkeit 
und Recht, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des deutschen Rechtsdenkens 
und zur Sittenlehre, Reich und Recht in der Deutschen Philosophie, Bd. I, p. 
282; H.-L. Schreiber, Der Begriff der Rechtspflicht. Quellenstudien zu seiner 
Geschichte, 1968, p. 42 f. 
13 R. Alexy, Ralf Dreiers Interpretation der Kantischen Rechtsdefinition, in: 
R. Alexy. (ed.), Integratives Verstehen. Zur Rechtsphilosophie Ralf Dreiers, 
2005, p. 101 fn. 37; Kersting (fn. 6), p. 142, refers to this as a “moral-theological 
opinion”.
14 Kalscheuer (fn. 11), p. 206, fn. 1143.
15 I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Akademieausgabe Bd. 3, 2. Aufl., 
1907/1914,  p. 574.
16 G. Geismann calls this thesis a “stale as well as an overcome thesis” that 
“in the future will inherit the same status within the philosophy of right as 
the thesis of ‘horror vacui’ of nature within phsysics” (G. Geismann, Recht 
und Moral in der Philosophie Kants, in Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, Bd. 
14, Themenschwerpunkt: Recht und Sittlichkeit bei Kant, B. Sharon Byrd, 
Joachim Hruschka and Jan C. Joerden (eds.), 2006, p. 3 (23)). For Geismanns 
Interpretation on Kant see H. Oberer, Rezension zu Georg Geismann: Kant 
und kein Ende (Bd. 3: Pax Kantiana oder Der Rechtsweg zum Weltfrieden), 
Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger 66/4/2013, p. 348 ff. as well as H.  Oberer, 
Noch einmal zu Kants Rechtsbegründung, Kant-Studien 2010, p. 380 ff.
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For some, the thesis cannot explain, why, according to 
Kant, ethically optional actions should also benefit from legal 
protection.17 If protecting the realization of moral duties in 
the empirical–social world were the task of the law, it would 
follow that any action which is optional according to the ca-
tegorical imperative is legally irrelevant. Hence there would 
be no reason, according to the thesis of protection, to legally 
protect morally optional actions. There would be even less 
of a reason to legally protect (allegedly) immoral actions: 
“Those who want to place drinking of beer or riding in the woods 
under legal protection, because it could be the expression of a 
morally bound maxim, would not want to give the same pro-
tection to actions, they consider morally forbidden (for example 
homosexuality or incest or active euthanasia).“18 
These objections to the thesis of protection refer to the 
scope of the judicial area of protection and with it the above-
-mentioned differences of opinion between the majority 
opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court and the opinion 
given by Federal Constitutional Court Judge D. Grimm in 
his dissenting vote: If one only wants to legally protect ac-
tions when they are the expression of moral–autonomous 
acts, it follows – according to the opinion of D. Grimm – that 
one should disregard entirely trivial actions. The thesis of 
protection thus corresponds – at least at first sight – more 
with D. Grimm´s restrictive opinion than with the majority 
opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court and Kant`s 
universal law of right, according to which any – including 
trivial (and even harmful) – actions at least prima facie enjoy 
judicial protection. 
17 Alexy (fn. 7), p. 102 fn. 37; Kersting (fn. 6), p. 147 f.
18 Geismann (fn. 8), P. 321.
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Closely interwoven with the above-mentioned ob-
jection to the thesis of protection is the above-mentioned 
criticism that the thesis would degrade the law and turn it 
into the servant of morality.19 Kant, it is said, considered law 
and ethics to be equal. The thesis of protection on the other 
hand leads to an illegal moralization of the law, which Kant 
rejected. According to this view, the thesis of protection is 
“separated by an abyss” from Kant`s Doctrine of Law.20 
The aforementioned objections to the thesis of protec-
tion can be refuted.21 The “problem,” that according to Kant 
– allegedly in opposition to the thesis of protection – ethically 
optional (and possibly even ethically forbidden) actions also 
benefit from legal protection, can be dismissed by referencing 
Kant`s epistemic modesty in regards to questions of ethics 
(1.). The thesis of protection furthermore does not lead to an 
improper moralization of the law, because for factual reasons 
morality cannot be enforced anyway by means of coercion, 
i.e. judicially, and, in addition, must not be enforced for 
ethical reasons (2.). 
1 The universal law of right as an expression of 
ethical modesty
The objection that the thesis of protection cannot ex-
plain the far-reaching extent of protection of the universal 
law of right discounts Kant`s epistemic reservation: Accor-
ding to Kant there are two epistemological problems when 
it comes to ethical actions. For one, it cannot be said with 
19 Geismann (fn. 8), p. 319.
20 Geismann (fn. 8), p. 319.
21 A detailed rebuttal of all criticisms of the thesis of protection can be found 
in Kalscheuer (fn. 11), p. 206 ff.  
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certainty, to what actions a person is actually ethically obli-
gated. Secondly, it cannot be said with certainty, whether a 
person is acting ethically or not. Because it cannot even be 
determined with certainty within one`s own character what 
the actual driving force behind any given action is.22 
The reason for Kant`s epistemic reservation in ques-
tions of ethics can be found in the intelligibility of the catego-
rical imperative - no assumption in the realm of experience 
corresponds to the categorical imperative. In other words: 
The categorical imperative is not, according to Kant, sensu-
ally experienceable and therefore cannot be applied to the 
empirical-social world immediately, i.e. schematically. It 
needs an indirect, i.e. symbolic, representation.23 The most 
important conclusion, which results from the only symbo-
lically possible application of the categorical imperative to 
the empirical-social world, is this: According to Kant the 
categorical imperative itself cannot err, but a human being 
while trying to implement it can.24 Due to the only feasibly 
symbolic implementation of the categorical imperative it is, 
according to Kant, impossible to create a deductively justified 
catalog for a multitude of ethical responsibilities that is of 
22 Kant (fn. 5), p. 392 f.: “For a human being cannot see into the depths of his 
own heart so as to be quite certain, even in a single action, of the purity of 
his moral intention and the sincerity of his deposition, even when he has 
no doubts about the legality of his action.”
23 See I. Kant, Critique of practical reason, Akademieausgabe Bd. 5, 
1908/1913, p. 352: “Every idea that are highlighted a priori with concepts 
are therefore schemes or symbols, the first of which includes direct and the 
second indirect presentations of the concept.” Kant tries to achieve the 
symbolical presentation of the categorical imperative through the doctrine 
of typicality. See H. Bielefeldt, Kants Symbolik. Ein Schlüssel zu kritischen 
Freiheitsphilosophie, 2001, p. 54 ff.; H.J. Paton, Der Kategorische Imperativ, 
1962, p. 189 ff.
24 See Kalscheuer (fn.11), p. 38 ff.
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timeless validity.25 In its application to the empirical-social 
world the categorical imperative thus does not offer “final 
solutions, but assists with drafting problems, which enable 
the judgmental assessment relating to the autonomous iden-
tification of actions.”26 
Because of the epistemological problems connected to 
the utilization of the categorical imperative, and the unmana-
geable amount of possible ethical responsibilities in Kant27, it 
seems logical that he generally places all actions under legal 
protection, so long as they are compatible with everybody`s 
universal freedom of action. According to Kant, the appli-
cation of the categorical imperative in the empirical-social 
world does not lead to definitive ethical answers. As long 
as rights of others are not affected, it is therefore prohibited, 
to refuse to place actions under legal protection, which have 
with apparent certainty been identified as unethical. To put it 
positively: As long as the rights of others are not violated, it is 
necessary to place actions under legal protection, even if they 
have been identified with apparent certainty as unethical.
The universal law of right is therefore based on epis-
temological doubts; it is an expression of ethical modesty: 
Any action, which is compatible with everybody`s universal 
freedom of action, could (but does not have to) be an ethi-
cally demanded action and this justifies and demands that 
25 H.-D. Klein, Formale und materiale Prinzipien in Kants Ethik, in: Kant-
Studien Bd. 60(1969), p.183(186).
26 G. Luf, Die “Typik der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft” und ihre Anwendung 
auf Kants Rechtslehre, in Freiheit als Rechtsprinzip. Rechtsphilosophische 
Aufsätze, hrsg. v. Elisabeth Holzleithner u. Alexander Somek, 2008, 
p. 133(139).
27 According to Kant, it is an incomplete (moral) responsibility to develop the 
gifts given to one (Kant (fn. 1), p. 423). The concept of gift includes physical 
powers as well (Kant (fn. 5), p. 445; see Paton (fn. 22), p. 185). That is why 
every physical exercise – for example riding in the woods – is part of the 
potentially morally responsibilities of human beings.  
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the complete range of external freedom of action is legally 
protected, as long as it is compatible with everybody`s uni-
versal freedom of action. 
2 No illegitimate moralization of the law
As to the alleged illegitimate moralization of the law, 
which is supposedly entailed by the thesis of protection, it 
can be countered that this objection mistakes the essence 
of Kant`s ideas of autonomy and morality: Both for factual 
and for normative reasons, which result from the essence of 
autonomy, the thesis of protection does not lead to an illegal 
moralization of the law.
The essence of autonomy lies in a human being follo-
wing the categorical imperative, without being affected by 
external influences or necessities. To force a human being 
into ethical action would be, according to Kant, “a contra-
diction (in adjecto); because the latter would already include 
pressured freedom in its concept.”28 For Kant autonomous, 
i.e. ethical, action is , “an act of freedom” that, if enforced, 
would be “at the same moment not free” and would the-
refore invalidate itself.29 The coercion itself or the fear of 
force would lead to a human being performing a morally 
demanded action not based on the categorical imperative, 
i.e. for autonomous reasons, but rather for heteronomous, 
i.e. non-moral, reasons. According to Kant, morals can there-
fore not be enforced by coercion, i.e. legally. For this reason 
alone, the thesis of protection does not lead to an illegal 
moralization of the law30.
28 I. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Akademieaugabe Bd. 
6, 1907/1914, p. 95.
29 Kant (fn. 5), p. 381.
30 See Kalscheuer (fn.11), p. 213 f.
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Additionally it is – contrary to the opinion of the criti-
ques of the thesis of protection – exactly the other way round: 
Precisely because the universal law of right finds its inner 
reason in the categorical imperative, in accordance with the 
thesis of protection, the thesis does not lead to an illegitimate 
moralization of the law. The derivation of the universal law 
of right from the categorical imperative rather means that the 
universal law of right has to be entirely free of morals.31 In 
other words: According to Kant, one cannot enforce morals 
by coercion, i.e. legally, and one is not allowed to enforce 
morals with force.32 “Every political common being” could 
indeed desire “that it would include in itself a control over 
the minds according to the laws of virtue,” but due to the 
essence of autonomy this should never be enforced: 
“Caution to the Legislator, who wants to create a constitution 
aimed at ethical purposes by coercion! Not only would he achieve 
the opposite of an ethical constitution, but he would undermine 
it politically and cause uncertainty within.”33
For Kant moral autonomy will only be sufficiently 
protected if the human being – in H. Bielefeldt’s34 words – has 
the opportunity “to ‘withdraw’ oneself to one`s legal right 
from the intrusiveness of an authoritarian social or public 
moralization, or, if need be, to hide behind the law.”
31 According to Kant, the universal law of right is a law “that lays an obligation 
on me, but it does not at all expect, far less demand, that I myself should limit 
my freedom to those conditions just for the sake of this obligation” (Kant (fn. 
5), p. 231).That the universal law of right Is to be seen as (morally) binding 
is, according to Kant, therefore no demand of the universal law of right 
itself, but a demand of morals: “That I make it my maxim to act rightly is a 
demand that ethics makes on me.” (Kant (fn. 5), p. 231); see Kalscheuer (fn. 
11), p. 98 ff. 
32 See Kalscheuer (fn. 11), p. 217 ff.
33 Kant (fn. 27), p. 95f.
34 Bielefeldt (fn. 22), p. 111.
Fiete Kalscheuer 203
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 118 | pp. 191-205 | jan./jun. 2019
The fact that the universal law of right refers to the ca-
tegorical imperative as an inner cause, thus only ostensibly 
leads to the contradiction, that the universal law of right is 
not allowed to position itself on the morality of the indivi-
dual. The legal right which follows from the universal law 
of right to force someone to abstain from a certain action, 
which unjustifiably encroaches on someone else`s area of 
protection of the universal freedom of action, may neither 
be based on morality of the person entitled to coerce nor on 
the (lack of) morality of the person subject to the coercion.35
In this context, the following must be taken in consi-
deration: Only the deduction of the universal law of right 
from the categorical imperative can explain why Kant atta-
ches such a great degree of importance to the law, that he 
describes “the right of human beings” as “the most sacred 
[…] that God has on earth;”36 it is only by acknowledging 
the correlation of derivation between law and morals that it 
is possible to explain why Kant declares the right of human 
beings to be “the apple of God`s Eye”37. It is not that an abyss 
separates Kant’s doctrine of law from the advocates of the 
thesis of protection, but rather it is the other way around: 
Those who assume that the categorical imperative and the 
universal law of right are independent from one another 
degrade the law. They fail to understand that the universal 
law of right draws its inner worth from the categorical im-
perative. 
35 Kalscheuer (fn. 11), p. 213 f.
36 I. Kant. Toward Perpetual Peace, in The Cambridge Edition Of The Works 
Of Immanuel Kant – Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. M.J. Gregor 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], p. 325.
37 Ibid. 
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III. Conclusion  
There are, in accordance with everything that has been 
said in this essay, two arguments that – originating from the 
thesis of protection – could explain why for Kant - at least 
prima facie – the entirety of the universal freedom of action 
is legally protected: an epistemological-factual argument 
and a normative one. The epistemological-factual argument 
for the protection of the universal freedom of action is that 
morality cannot be enforced by coercion. After all, it cannot 
be said with certainty whether or not a human being acts 
morally; even if one could identify the morality of an action, 
it could not be enforced by coercion. The normative argu-
ment – connected to the epistemological-factual argument 
– rests on Kant`s understanding that it would be morally 
illegitimate to try to enforce morality by force. This would 
contradict the essence of moral autonomy, which is based 
on the absence of external coercion. 
The thesis of protection supported in this essay subse-
quently illustrates that in the disagreement about the inter-
pretation of Art. 2 I German Basic Law – originating from 
Kant - both the majority opinion of the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany and the opinion by D. Grimm, in his dissent-
ing vote, contain a bit of truth. D. Grimm`s opinion, according 
to which Art. 2 I German Basic Law as per the wording deals 
with personal development and thus with developmental 
opportunities of human beings as moral-autonomous beings, 
has to be agreed with in principle. Regarding the extent of 
Art. 2 I of the German Basic Law the majority opinion of the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany is also right: Due to 
epistemological-factual and normative reasons, the decision 
as to what is especially important for personal development 
can only be made by the subject of fundamental rights alone. 
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That is why the entirety of external freedom of action of hu-
man beings is worthy of legal protection.
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